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This article looks at the evolution of international
competitiveness in the countries of Latin America and
the Caribbean in the 1990s, focusing on the microeconomic
and sectoral aspects. It evaluates the competitive performance
of the region’s countries, contrasting it with that of their
main competitors in the developing world; it analyses
the corporate actors involved, including the subsidiaries
of transnational enterprises and large locally owned firms;
and it sets forth some political considerations. Although
progress has been made with competitiveness in the region,
this has been largely confined to just a few countries,
sectors and firms. Differences in the institutional conditions
under which the countries participate in the world economy,
and in their comparative cost advantages, have resulted
in the emergence of two distinct trading styles. In Mexico
and the Caribbean Basin, exports of manufactures assembled
for the United States market predominate. In South America,
on the other hand, natural resource production and processing
activities prevail, with more technologically advanced
manufactures having some presence in intraregional trade,
especially within Mercosur. Both sectoral specializations
present opportunities and problems. Improvements in
the competitiveness of large companies (whether
transnational or locally owned) have enhanced their
efficiency. But the same is not true of other agents in
the countries’ economies, whose production structures
have thus become more polarized. This polarization needs
to be dealt with by policy initiatives. Four areas of action
are important: increasing efforts to attract selected foreign
direct investment (FDI); strengthening the links between
leading companies and the other firms in each country;
supporting the creation of global knowledge networks;
and enhancing the ability of domestic companies to enter
into joint ventures and strategic alliances with their global
competitors.
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I
Introduction
For more than a decade, the countries of Latin America
and the Caribbean have been proceeding with structural
reforms aimed at improving production efficiency,
promoting growth and generating employment in the
region.1 The new economic model that the reforms put
in place to achieve these objectives entails far-reaching
involvement in the world economy. Participation in
what are growing and increasingly integrated
international flows of goods, services, technology and
capital is seen as a prerequisite for taking advantage of
the benefits generated by the removal of restrictions
on the operations of economic agents. Within this
framework, the State has yielded leadership to private
enterprises that operate in much less regulated
economies than was the case until just over a decade
ago. Openness, privatization and competition are thus
the cornerstones of the new model (Reinhardt and Peres,
2000).
Globalization, understood as the movement
towards a single world market, has been the result of
microeconomic forces generated by the technological
revolution now in progress. Lower information handling
and transport costs have made it profitable for some
industries to carry out production, marketing and
research and development activities on a world scale
(Turner and Hodges, 1992), and this has increased the
importance of economies of scale in those sectors and
given the ascendancy to large firms. The
homogenization of preferences, technologies and
products predicted by Levitt (1983) would appear to
be taking place. Public policies of national or local
scope are playing a secondary role in this process, since
in general they can do no more than check it or slow it
down, without changing its direction or effects (Oman,
1994).
The increasing integration of markets worldwide
is opening up great opportunities and posing major
challenges for developing countries, which may or may
not take advantage of the former and take the right steps
to deal with the latter (Sunkel and Mortimore, 1997).
If the opportunities are to be fully capitalized upon,
countries need to participate efficiently in this world
market, which can only happen if companies become
increasingly competitive (Lall and Mortimore, 2000).
The objective of the present study is to set forth
some considerations that will assist in evaluating the
competitive efficiency of the Latin American and
Caribbean countries in the 1990s, paying special
attention to two aspects: the groups of economic sectors
that have been gaining or losing competitiveness and
the types of companies (transnational or local, public-
sector or private-sector) responsible for this sectoral
and national performance. The study is divided into
five sections. Following this introduction, section II
looks at the way competitiveness has developed in the
region’s countries by comparison with their main
competitors in the developing world, i.e., the more
dynamic countries of East and South-East Asia. Section
III analyses the companies that are playing the leading
role in this process: transnationals operating in the
region, and large locally owned firms. Lastly, sections
IV and V offer conclusions and policy considerations.
1
 The term “structural reform” is used to refer to the strategies for
change followed by most of the region’s countries since the early
1980s, although important initiatives of this kind were pursued in
the previous decade, for example in Chile. Its basic components
have been trade liberalization, privatization of State enterprises,
deregulation of markets and businesses, the opening up and
liberalization of domestic financial markets and the capital account,
and fiscal reform. Different authors employ terms such as “economic
reform” and “structural change” to describe the same phenomenon
(Stallings and Peres, 2000).
37C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 4  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 1
CORPORATE COMPETIT IVENESS IN  LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN  •  MICHAEL MORTIMORE AND WILSON PERES
II
The region’s place in the international
economy in the 1990s
categories of manufactures in which developing
countries have gained market share, four activities are
particularly dynamic: electronics, continuous process
industries, vehicle manufacturing and wearing apparel.
These manufactures are not based on natural resources,
and they are concentrated at the high-technology
(electronics) and low-technology (apparel) ends;
activities involving an intermediate level of technology
(vehicle manufacturing and continuous process and
engineering industries) have not developed to the same
degree.
The developing countries of Asia took advantage
of the opportunities open to them in all areas, even
natural resource-based manufacturing; they made the
greatest progress, however, with non-natural
resource-based manufactures, especially those
involving high (145% increase in market share) and
intermediate (123% increase) levels of technology.
In particular, while Asia tended to specialize further
in high- and medium-technology sectors, Latin
America did so in medium- and low-technology
sectors.
The increases in market share achieved by Latin
America were smaller than those achieved by Asia. In
high-technology manufactures, the increase was one
percentage point, as compared with over 16 points in
the case of Asia. In short, of the almost 13 percentage
points represented by the opportunities available in non-
natural resource-based manufacturing, Asia took almost
11 points, while Latin America took less than two
points.
Developing countries have thus been given an
opportunity to enter the international market, and
much of their success has had to do with the
dissemination of integrated international production
systems (IIPS) (UNCTAD, 1993 and Lall and Mortimore,
2000). Only a few countries, however, have managed
to benefit from these systems. To take advantage of
international trade opportunities, countries have to
incorporate themselves into the strategies of
efficiency-seeking transnational enterprises. And not
all those that have participated have done so
successfully.
1. Competitiveness in the international context
Transnationalization and the growth of international
trade have been central factors in globalization and the
progress of developing countries. While the share of
international trade in the GDP of the industrialized
countries has held steady at about 40%, in developing
countries it rose from about 35% in the early 1980s to
close to 50% in the late 1990s. It is in fact developing
countries that have capitalized most on international
trade opportunities; greater competition among
economies is the result of their eagerness to boost trade
flows.
During the period from 1985 to 1998, manufactures
(to three digits in the SITC, revision 2) continued on a
growth course and increased their export share relative
to primary products. In this period, the share of
manufactures in the total value of world exports rose
from 74% to 84%, while that of natural resources fell
from 23% to 12% (CAN 2000).2
Table 1 shows in which activities and to what extent
the developing countries have taken advantage of
manufacturing export opportunities. They have
surpassed the industrialized countries in this respect,
gaining three percentage points of market share in the
period 1985-1998. This progress was due to three types
of non-natural resource-based manufactures (high
technology content: 16.6 points; medium: 9.1 points;
and low: 16 points) and not to natural resource-based
manufactures or unprocessed natural resources, as
might be expected if a simplistic view were taken of
comparative advantages. Also unexpected is the
increase in the developed countries’ share of the market
for natural resources, which rose from 37.8% in 1985
to 43.2% in 1998.
A more detailed breakdown of the information,
using the CAN 2000 software, shows that in the three
2
 By CAN 2000 is meant the Competitive Analysis of Nations
software, 2000 version, developed by the ECLAC Division of
Production, Productivity and Management (for the user manual
see LC/R.1258).
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There are large differences between Asia and the
Latin America and Caribbean region.3 Table 2 shows
that, in the period 1985-1998, the countries of this
region as a whole barely maintained their world market
share, in marked contrast with China and the countries
of South-East Asia with a large natural resource base
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand).
The region also failed to match the results achieved by
the countries of East Asia that specialized in
manufacturing, whose market share at the beginning
of the period was already higher than the region’s was
in the late 1990s. The contrast is most marked at the
beginning of the period, when the region’s market share
fell by more than a percentage point just as Asia was
enjoying strong growth. In the second half of the
decade, the pace slowed in Asia, with the exception of
China, while Latin America began a gradual climb back
to the levels of market share it had held 10 years before.
TABLE 1
World market share, by export type, 1985-1998
(Percentages)
Export type Industrial countries Developing countries Developing Asia Latin America
1985 1998 1985 1998 1985 1998 1985 1998
Natural resources 37.8 43.2 62.1 56.8 29.7 27.4 12.3 13.8
Manufactures based on natural resources 68.1 69.5 31.3 30.5 12.4 14.4 6.5 6.2
Manufactures not based on natural resources 82.4 69.7 17.5 30.3 11.6 22.1 2.5 4.3
Low-technology 51.5 35.5 48.5 64.5 39.1 49.8 4.0 6.7
Medium-technology 89.4 80.3 10.6 19.7 5.2 11.6 2.4 4.5
High-technology 83.0 66.4 17.0 33.6 11.3 27.6 2.0 3.0
Others 71.1 62.2 28.9 37.7 6.4 11.0 4.1 4.1
Total 68.7 65.8 31.3 34.2 16.0 21.5 5.6 5.7
Source: The authors, on the basis of the CAN 2000 software.
TABLE 2
World market share, by groups of countries
(Percentages)
Year Latin America China Hong Kong, Rep. of Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia,
and the Caribbean Singapore and Taiwan Philippines and Thailand
1985 5.57 1.60 5.51 2.80
1986 5.03 1.76 6.02 2.57
1987 4.66 1.94 6.68 2.52
1988 4.63 2.22 7.09 2.65
1989 4.61 2.45 6.97 2.72
1990 4.53 2.82 6.95 2.89
1991 4.38 3.18 6.90 3.04
1992 4.41 3.74 7.25 3.38
1993 4.62 4.26 7.48 3.72
1994 4.81 4.62 7.66 4.00
1995 5.01 4.81 7.63 4.16
1996 5.27 5.06 7.59 4.30
1997 5.52 5.33 7.44 4.36
1998 5.66 5.50 7.37 4.37
Source: The authors, on the basis of the CAN 2000 software.
3
 Despite the crisis of the late 1990s, the countries of East Asia
have also achieved much better results than Latin America in terms
of GDP growth, industrialization and improvements in the
competitiveness of manufacturing exports. In Asia, international
trade has clearly operated as an engine of economic growth (Lall,
2000). In Latin America, on the other hand, progress with per capita
GDP growth, industrialization and manufacturing exports has not
been encouraging; by and large, the benefits expected from greater
integration into the international market have not materialized
(Mortimore, Bonifaz and Duarte de Oliveira, 1997).
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Latin America’s world trade performance is
technologically inferior to that of East and South-East
Asia as well. Table 3 provides information on the
dynamic of technological specialization indices (TSIs)
for the exports of the region and its main Asian
competitors.4 Although the TSI of the region virtually
doubled between 1985 and 1998, it was still lower than
the index values achieved not only by Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, the Republic of Korea,
Singapore and Taiwan Province of China, but also by
Asian countries with a large natural resource base
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand).
Furthermore, the dynamic of the region is determined
by that of Mexico, a country which has achieved TSI
levels similar to or higher than those of East Asia, while
the best the countries of Mercosur can show is a
modestly upward trend, with levels much lower than
those of Asia and Mexico. The region is even lagging
well behind China, which still has a low TSI.
Lastly, the contrast between East Asia and Latin
America is also reflected in the ranking of the 10
economies that have most improved their international
competitiveness (measured in relation to world imports)
for the 50 product groups (down to three digits in the
SITC, revision 2) that were most dynamic in world trade
during 1985-1998. The 10 economies, in descending
order, are China, Mexico, Singapore, Malaysia, Spain,
Taiwan, Thailand, Ireland, the Republic of Korea and
the Philippines. In other words, seven Asian economies,
two European ones and one Latin American one. These
are the economies that have managed to take greatest
advantage of the shift in trade patterns and the
international economy towards a single world market.
With the exception of the Republic of Korea and
Taiwan, whose trading success has been driven by local
companies, the progress these economies have achieved
with trade has been directly linked to the IIPS of
transnational companies. Furthermore, six of the 10 also
feature among the economies with the fastest per capita
GDP growth, which would seem to indicate that their
international trading success has served to stimulate
and develop their economies. Neither Mexico nor Spain
achieved any remarkable increase in per capita GDP over
the same period, however, which suggests that for
lasting success something more than the conquest of
markets is required.
All the results described in this section indicate
that the region is not very competitive, has made little
progress in increasing its world market share and the
technology-intensiveness of its exports, and has shown
TABLE 3
Technological specialization index, 1985-1998
Year China Hong Kong, Rep. of Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Latin Mexico Mercosur
Singapore and Taiwan Philippines and Thailand America countries
1985 0.153 0.849 0.267 0.272 0.650 0.289
1986 0.173 0.858 0.269 0.297 0.765 0.309
1987 0.216 0.917 0.305 0.322 0.931 0.307
1988 0.273 0.991 0.344 0.336 1.007 0.303
1989 0.320 1.054 0.394 0.336 1.060 0.285
1990 0.339 1.082 0.454 0.340 1.107 0.274
1991 0.350 1.111 0.523 0.365 1.205 0.289
1992 0.360 1.154 0.603 0.402 1.336 0.308
1993 0.378 1.225 0.692 0.428 1.444 0.311
1994 0.420 1.377 0.802 0.437 1.483 0.295
1995 0.461 1.492 0.895 0.447 1.518 0.280
1996 0.500 1.566 0.979 0.465 1.514 0.294
1997 0.524 1.529 1.021 0.508 1.575 0.322
1998 0.534 1.508 1.048 0.526 1.582 0.343
Source: The authors, on the basis of the CAN 2000 software and the methodology of Alcorta and Peres (1998).
4
 The TSI is calculated as the ratio between the market share of a
country or group of countries in high- and medium-technology
sectors and its share in low-technology sectors. Both the absolute
levels and the rates of change of TSIs are significant. A value lower
(higher) than one indicates that a country’s market share in high-
and medium-technology sectors is higher (lower) than its share in
low-technology sectors. A rising (falling) value for the TSI over
time indicates a shift towards higher (lower) market shares in high-
and medium-technology markets. For further details, see Alcorta
and Peres (1998).
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only a moderate ability to adjust its export profile to
the changing dynamic of international trade. The results
also indicate that, within Latin America and the
Caribbean, Mexico and the Caribbean Basin need to
be distinguished from South America.
2. Subregional developments
Of the 25 Latin American and Caribbean countries
included in table 4, only nine gained world market share
between 1985 and 1998, while four saw no change.
The largest number (12 countries) lost ground, some
of them, such as Brazil and Venezuela, to a significant
degree. Among the seven gainers were Mexico and six
countries in the Caribbean basin. Although Argentina
and Chile rank second and third, respectively, Mexico
gained more than twice as much as all the other eight
countries whose share increased put together.
The rise of the Central American and Caribbean
countries (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) should not be
dismissed because of their low absolute share of world
trade. Rather, it should be appreciated in the light of
the extremely low shares they held at the start of the
period. The fact that their performance has been positive
is in itself deserving of attention, given the difficult
starting conditions. The advances made by Argentina
and Chile have followed different patterns. While
Argentina’s trade has progressed essentially because
of automobile and energy exports to Mercosur, Chile
has developed an export trade that is quite diversified
in terms of destinations, although it is largely confined
to processed and unprocessed natural resources.5
If Latin America is divided into two groups,
Mexico and the Caribbean Basin on the one hand and
South America on the other, a very marked contrast
emerges in their trade performance and international
competitiveness.6 While Mexico and the Caribbean
Basin increased their competitiveness sharply (from
2.1% to 2.8% between 1985 and 1998), the opposite
happened in South America, whose international market
share fell from 3.3% to 2.8% between those years. In
terms of products, the market share of South America
increased in sectors that were not very dynamic in world
trade (natural resources and manufactures based on
them), while the exports of Mexico and the Caribbean
Basin centred on non-natural resource-based
manufactures whose international trade performance
was highly dynamic. The same pattern can be seen in
the export structure.
The 10 main exports of South America are almost
all natural resources such as crude oil, animal feed,
petroleum derivatives, coffee, copper, fruit and nuts,
the sole exception being the compensated trade of the
Mercosur automotive industry, which largely accounts
for Argentina’s increased competitiveness (table 5).
Mexico and the Caribbean Basin, on the other hand,
specialize in non-natural resource-based manufactures
such as motor vehicles, electronics and wearing apparel.
Where international competitiveness is concerned, they
are two different worlds.
Brazil, an economy of continental proportions,
merits special consideration. The domestic market has
traditionally been very important for the strategic
decision-making of companies located in the country,
but other factors would suggest that Brazil’s lack of
TABLE 4
World market share, 1985-1998
(Percentages)
Country 1985 1998 Difference
Mexico 1.55 2.24 0.69
Argentina 0.37 0.51 0.14
Chile 0.23 0.32 0.09
Costa Rica 0.07 0.10 0.03
Guatemala 0.06 0.08 0.02
Honduras 0.05 0.07 0.02
Dominican Republic 0.08 0.10 0.02
El Salvador 0.04 0.05 0.01
Colombia 0.24 0.24 0.00
Paraguay 0.03 0.03 0.00
Nicaragua 0.02 0.02 0.00
Jamaica 0.04 0.04 0.00
Uruguay 0.07 0.06 –0.01
Cuba 0.03 0.02 –0.01
Guyana 0.02 0.01 –0.01
Suriname 0.02 0.01 –0.01
Bolivia 0.04 0.02 –0.02
Barbados 0.02 0.00 –0.02
Haiti 0.03 0.01 –0.02
Peru 0.17 0.12 –0.05
Panama 0.10 0.05 –0.05
Ecuador 0.17 0.11 –0.06
Trinidad and Tobago 0.10 0.04 –0.06
Venezuela 0.66 0.41 –0.25
Brazil 1.37 1.01 –0.36
Source: The authors, on the basis of the CAN 2000 software.
5
 The differing importance of Mercosur in the two cases is illustrated
by the fact that Argentina’s share of industrialized country markets
fell from 0.31% to 0.22% in 1985-1998, while Chile’s rose from
0.21% to 0.26%.
6
 This has been described in Reinhardt and Peres (2000) as the
existence of two different international trading styles “north and
south of the Panama canal”.
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international competitiveness is worrying even from that
point of view. For more than a decade, the country’s
overriding policy objective has been to increase its
penetration of the world market. The results are not
encouraging. Although some activities with a high
technological content have been added to the country’s
exports (aircraft, cellular telephones, computers), their
proportion of total exports is still small, and there is no
sign of it being able to rise significantly in the short
term (Miranda, 2000). Again, Brazil’s long-term
competitiveness indicators have declined, indicating a
weakening in its international position that cannot be
attributed to the size of its economy.
The countries of South America have failed to
enhance their international competitiveness because
they have only a small presence in dynamic
manufactures, whether produced by local companies
(as occurred in Japan, the Republic of Korea and
Taiwan) or by transnational enterprises’ IIPS. They have
been unable to attract this kind of FDI, and are thus at a
TABLE 5
South America: Competitiveness in world imports, 1985-1998
(Percentages)
1985 1990 1995 1998
I. Market share 3.34 2.74 2.73 2.81
1. Natural resourcesa 7.12 7.59 8.93 10.03
2. Manufactures based on natural resourcesb 5.03 4.33 4.55 4.59
3. Manufactures not based on natural resourcesc 1.21 1.13 1.11 1.17
– Low-technologyd 1.93 1.73 1.66 1.53
– Medium-technologye 1.16 1.18 1.32 1.51
– High-technologyf 0.45 0.35 0.28 0.38
4. Othersg 2.08 1.14 1.33 1.42
II. Export structure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1. Natural resourcesa 49.2 44.3 43.6 44.0
2. Manufactures based on natural resourcesb 29.2 28.3 27.6 25.7
3. Manufactures not based on natural resourcesc 19.7 26.0 27.1 28.5
– Low-technologyd 8.2 10.6 10.1 9.0
– Medium-technologye 9.9 13.5 15.1 16.7
– High-technologyf 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.8
4. Othersg 1.9 1.4 1.7 1.8
III. Ten leading exports by contributionh A B 52.3 44.6 40.8 41.1
333 Petroleum oils, crude + 12.3 10.0 11.2 11.1
081 Feeding stuff for animals (not including unmilled cereals) + 4.4 4.4 4.7 4.3
334 Products derived from petroleum, refined – 10.7 7.2 4.4 4.3
071 Coffee and coffee substitutes – 9.9 4.6 4.1 4.1
682 Copper – 3.2 4.5 3.7 3.6
057 Fruit and nuts (not including oil nuts), fresh or dried + 2.9 3.9 3.6 3.6
281 Iron ore and concentrates + 4.1 4.4 3.3 3.1
222 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits + 2.2 2.4 2.1 2.5
781 Passenger motor vehicles + 0.6 0.7 1.2 2.3
287 Ores and concentrates of base metals + 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.3
Source: The authors, on the basis of the CAN 2000 software. The product groups are based on the Standard International Trade Classification
(SITC, revision 2).
a Contains 45 basic products that are simple to process, includes concentrates.
b Contains 65 items: 35 agricultural/forestry groups and 30 others (mainly metals, excluding steel, plus petroleum products, cement, glass,
etc.).
c Contains 120 groups representing the sum of d + e + f.
d Contains 44 items: 20 groups from the textile and garment category, plus 24 others (paper products, glass and steel, jewellery).
e Contains 58 items: five groups from the automotive industry, 22 from the processing industry and 31 from the engineering industry.
f Contains 18 items: 11 groups from the electronics category, plus another seven (pharmaceutical products, turbines, aircraft, instruments).
g Contains nine unclassified groups (mainly from section 9).
h In column A: groups belonging (*) to the 50 most dynamic in world imports, 1985-1998. In column B: groups where South America
gained (+) or lost (-) world import market share, 1985-1998.
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disadvantage to countries that have done so, such as
China, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand in Asia,
Ireland and Spain in Europe, and even Mexico. In other
words, South America has not been a magnet for FDI
by the transnational companies that are developing IIPS
to increase the efficiency of their operations. They have
been able to attract FDI from transnational companies
seeking to enter national markets for services
(telecommunications,7 electricity distribution, financial
services), but these activities, while they may have a
positive effect on the systemic competitiveness of the
beneficiary countries, do not have a direct impact on
their international market share.
TABLE 6
Mexico and the Caribbean Basin: Competitiveness in
world imports, 1985-1998
(Percentages)
1985 1990 1995 1998
I. Market share 2.13 1.73 2.21 2.80
1. Natural resourcesa 5.01 3.61 3.31 3.69
2. Manufactures based on natural resourcesb 1.43 1.15 1.30 1.53
3. Manufactures not based on natural resourcesc 1.17 1.41 2.22 2.95
– Low-technologyd 1.06 1.44 2.40 3.40
– Medium-technologye 1.09 1.43 2.35 2.97
– High-technologyf 1.50 1.34 1.84 2.55
4. Othersg 1.83 1.84 2.18 2.60
II. Export structure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1. Natural resourcesa 54.4 33.3 20.0 16.2
2. Manufactures based on natural resourcesb 13.1 11.9 9.7 8.6
3. Manufactures not based on natural resourcesc 29.9 51.3 66.9 71.9
– Low-technologyd 7.1 13.8 18.0 20.1
– Medium-technologye 14.6 25.7 33.1 32.8
– High-technologyf 8.2 8.0 15.8 19.0
4. Othersg 2.7 3.6 3.4 3.3
III. Ten leading exports by contributionh A B 43.3 36.2 37.0 38.9
781 Passenger motor vehicles + 0.6 4.4 7.6 7.5
333 Petroleum oils, crude – 33.2 15.6 7.6 6.2
773 Equipment for distributing electricity * + 1.8 3.3 3.8 3.9
846 Clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted * + 0.6 1.2 2.4 3.2
761 Television receivers * + 0.4 1.8 2.7 3.2
764 Telecommunications equipment and parts and accessories * – 2.4 2.2 2.9 3.2
752 Automatic data processing machines * + 0.1 1.3 1.9 3.1
782 Motor vehicles for the transport of goods + 0.4 0.4 2.2 2.9
931 Special transactions and commodities not classified
according to kind * + 1.9 2.9 2.8 2.8
784 Parts and accessories for motor vehicles + 1.9 3.1 3.0 2.8
Source: The authors, on the basis of the CAN 2000 software. The product groups are based on the Standard International Trade Classification
(SITC, revision 2).
a Contains 45 basic products that are simple to process, includes concentrates.
b Contains 65 items: 35 agricultural/forestry groups and 30 others (mainly metals, excluding steel, plus petroleum products, cement, glass,
etc.).
c Contains 120 groups representing the sum of d + e + f.
d Contains 44 items: 20 groups from the textile and garment category, plus 24 others (paper products, glass and steel, jewellery).
e Contains 58 items: five groups from the automotive industry, 22 from the processing industry and 31 from the engineering industry.
f Contains 18 items: 11 groups from the electronics category, plus another seven (pharmaceutical products, turbines, aircraft, instruments).
g Contains nine unclassified groups (mainly from section 9).
h In column A: groups belonging (*) to the 50 most dynamic in world imports, 1985-1998. In column B: groups where Mexico and the
Caribbean Basin gained (+) or lost (-) world import market share, 1985-1998.
7
 See ECLAC (forthcoming), chapter IV.
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The case of Mexico and the Caribbean Basin is
completely different (table 6). These countries have
made great progress with their international
competitiveness; this success, however, has not acted
as an engine for growth in their economies, as has been
the case in a number of Asian countries.
The ability of the Caribbean Basin to compete rests
essentially on a single industry, wearing apparel or
garments, and on a single market, the United States.
During the period 1980-2000, many Caribbean
countries took advantage of the new opportunities for
exporting garments to the United States market that
arose because of a production sharing mechanism8
allowing greater access to that market with low tariffs
and higher quotas for countries that assembled garments
using United States inputs. Production sharing brought
few benefits to the assembling countries since not only
did this mechanism penalize the inclusion of local
inputs, but the countries involved had little say in how
the mechanism was used and tended to become
embroiled in incentive wars to attract FDI from
transnational enterprises (Mortimore and Peres, 1998).
Ultimately, the system hindered efforts to create a local
industry based on domestic inputs (Mortimore, 1999).
The experience of Mexico was similar to that of
the Caribbean Basin, as production sharing was the key
to the improvement in the country’s international
competitiveness. In this case, however, the product
range extended beyond garments to include the
electronics and automotive industries, with some of the
world’s largest transnational companies in these
industries carrying out their international operations in
Mexico (Dussel, 1999 and 2000). The initiative that
set the Mexican experience apart from the Caribbean
one was the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) (Mortimore, Buitelaar and Bonifaz, 2000), as
a result of which Mexico not only obtained more
favourable access to the North American market, but
benefited from the application of the rules of origin
which operate within that integration system. Investing
companies have to comply with those rules for their
output to be regarded as being of North American origin
(Mortimore, 1998d and Calderón, Mortimore and Peres,
1996).9
Mexico has been one of the great gainers in terms
of international competitiveness, something that has
translated into the establishment of modern plants and
a boost to the Mexican economy in certain
internationalizing industries, such as the automotive,
electronics and wearing apparel industries. Mexican
export success has not resulted in balanced development
and sustained economic growth. Two parallel
economies exist side by side in the country: a modern
one, whose growth is based on exports to the North
American market, and a traditional one, based on
agriculture and other undynamic activities. The linkages
between the two economies are unsatisfactory and there
is little integration between the modern economy and
the rest of the national economy, which imports many
of its inputs and draws its dynamism from abroad.
III
The structure and behaviour
of economic agents
1. The transnationalization of the Latin American
economies
The globalization process is clearly revealed by the
preponderance of transnational companies. It is
calculated that these companies account for three
quarters of all FDI movements and two thirds of
international trade (one third in the form of intra-
company operations and one third in the form of trade
with unrelated companies). Flows of FDI increased
enormously in the 1990s to exceed US$ 850 billion in
1999, more than double the average for the period 1990-
1996. The FDI going to developing countries thus grew
8
 The nature and effects of the production sharing mechanism are
explained in greater detail in ECLAC (2000), chapter IV.
9
 A detailed analysis of the Mexican case can be found in ECLAC
(2000), chapter II.
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more strongly, becoming the main source of long-term
financing (World Bank, 1999).10
These large FDI flows are due to the international
expansion of transnational companies, and reveal the
growing presence and importance of these companies
in the emerging single market. Investment of this type
has two main uses: the purchase of existing assets in
the form of mergers and acquisitions,11 and the creation
of new assets in the form of IIPS. It is estimated that
half of all the investment that arrived in Latin America
in the 1990s went on purchasing existing assets. The
result of the whole process has been to strengthen the
strategic importance of transnational companies in the
region’s countries (ECLAC, 1998 and 2000 and Stumpo,
1998).
Mergers and acquisitions were of particular
importance in the FDI going to Latin America in the
1990s, when the region increased its share in the world
total of operations of this kind so that in 1999 it
accounted for 13.5% by value. Estimates by Mendes
de Paula, Pereira Silva and Couto da Silva (2000), based
on 1,685 transactions for which Thomson Financial
Securities Data gives values (out of a total of 3,291),
show that foreign companies accounted for 53.6% of
all mergers and acquisitions in Argentina, Brazil, Chile
and Mexico in 1990-1999.12 This share was particularly
high in Argentina and Chile, where it exceeded 60%.
The exception was Mexico, where domestic firms
played a very active role in privatizations of public-
sector enterprises, and took and retained control of the
largest privatized firm (Teléfonos de México, or Telmex,
acquired by Carso Group).
Domestic companies also participated in the
mergers and acquisitions process, carrying out
operations to the value of US$ 135.3 billion. The
information available shows, however, particularly in
the cases of Argentina and Mexico, that after an initial
stage in the early 1990s when the main buyers of
privatized enterprises were local companies or investors,
ownership was restructured in such a way that foreign
companies or investors took control of the formerly
State-owned enterprises. Two cases whose scale makes
them particularly important are those of commercial
banking in Mexico and public services, including
telephony, in Argentina (Garrido, 2000 and Kulfas,
2000). In both cases, privatized companies acquired
by local investors in the first half of the 1990s were
sold on to foreign partners or investors in the second
half of the decade.
In sectoral terms, the situation in the four countries
referred to varied greatly depending on the
macroeconomic circumstances, the time of privatization
and the economic structure of each country. For the
four countries taken together, 35% by value of all
operations took place in the infrastructure sectors
(including telecommunications and electrical energy),
19% in the financial sector and 17% in manufacturing
industry. Operations in the infrastructure and financial
sectors exceeded those in industry in all the countries
except Brazil, where industry accounted for 22% of
the total value of operations, this being the result of
privatizations in the iron and steel and petrochemical
industries in the early 1990s (Mendes de Paula, Pereira
Silva and Couto da Silva, 2000). In Argentina, on the
other hand, acquisitions in the oil sector predominated,
exceeding by a wide margin those carried out in
communications, banking and food and drink (Kulfas,
2000).
The large net inflows of FDI into Latin America
–unthinkable just a few years previously– had major
effects on the economic structure of the region, with
the main economic agents becoming transnationalized.
One consequence of the globalization process and
economic reforms in Latin America was the
strengthening of foreign companies and the weakening
of State ones, especially in the latter years. During the
1990s, transnational enterprises increased their activity
in Latin America, consolidating their penetration of the
manufacturing sector –particularly in the automotive
industry (Mortimore, 1998a and 1998b)– and
increasing their share of regional exports. In the service
sector, they took advantage of liberalization,
deregulation and privatization to enter areas where FDI
had previously had only limited access. In the ranks of
the region’s largest firms, the rise in the number of
transnationals coincided with the near disappearance
of State-owned enterprises, while the number of locally
owned private-sector companies remained virtually
unchanged (ECLAC, 2000).
Further evidence of the transnationalization process
in Latin America is provided by the constant rise of
FDI-related indicators. Net inflows increased twelvefold
between 1980 and 1998. Compared with gross fixed
10
 To the extent of 56.4% in 1998, as compared with 24.3% in
1990 (World Bank, 1999).
11
 In the industrial countries there are many merger operations
whereby two firms are fused into one, as well as acquisitions of
one firm by another. In the rest of the world, mergers are scarce,
and acquisitions are the most common type of operation.
12
 These four countries received 75% of all FDI of this type arriving
in the region.
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capital formation and GDP, these inflows grew more than
fourfold. Again, more than half of the total stock of FDI
in Latin America as of 1998 had arrived in the region
during that same decade. In short, a major process of
transnationalization took place in the region, and
transnational companies became the dominant
economic agents of the 1990s.
2. Changes in corporate structure and strategy
a) The advance of transnationals
Between 1990-1992 and 1998-1999, the best
performance among the 500 largest companies in Latin
America, measured by consolidated sales, was that
achieved by the subsidiaries of transnational enterprises.
The number of foreign firms in the list increased from
149 to 230 and their share of total sales rose from 27.4%
to 43%. By contrast, the number of State-owned
enterprises fell from 87 to 64 and their share of sales
fell from 33.2% to 18.8% (table 7).
As regards the activities of these 500 companies,
the most important changes took place in extractive and
service businesses. The sales share of the primary sector
fell from 27.7% to 19.3%, while that of the service
sector rose from 29.9% to 38%. Manufacturing
companies retained their dominant share of some 42%
of total sales. The strong and steady growth of services
is largely due to the liberalization of telecommuni-
cations and electricity and the privatization of the
public-sector companies that supplied these services.
Changes among the 100 largest manufacturing
companies were also considerable. Between 1990-1992
and 1998-1999, the share of sales accounted for by
subsidiaries of transnational enterprises rose from
53.2% to 62.7%, while that of domestic private-sector
companies fell from 42.6% to 37.3%. State-owned
enterprises virtually disappeared from the equation.
About half of all sales by foreign companies were in
the motor vehicles and parts subsector, which indicates
that the impact of transnational companies in the Latin
American industrialization process has been
concentrated in this area, primarily in Argentina, Brazil
and Mexico.
In exports, the area where international
competitiveness is most clearly reflected, transnational
companies increased their share in the total exports of
the region’s 200 largest exporters from 29.2% in 1990-
1992 to 43.2% in 1998-1999; at the same time, the share
of domestic private-sector and State-owned companies
declined. These 200 large companies had annual exports
of US$ 134.9 billion in 1997-1999, or 47% of the
region’s total exports by value.
TABLE 7
Latin America: Results of the leading companies in the 1990s
(Percentages)
Share in 1990-1992 1994-1996a 1998-1999
Sales of the 500 largest companies
Foreign 27.4 32.1 43.7
Local private-sector 39.4 41.0 37.2
State-owned 33.2 26.9 19.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sales of the 100 largest manufacturing companies
Foreign 53.2 59.3 61.7
Local private-sector 42.6 38.6 37.3
State-owned 4.2 2.1 1.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Exports of the 200 largest exporters
Foreign ... 29.2 43.2
Local private-sector ... 35.9 32.7
State-owned ... 34.9 24.1
Total ... 100.0 100.0
Source: Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, ECLAC.
a
 The export data are averages for 1995-1996.
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Table 8 lists the exporting companies in the region
that had more than US$ 1 billion in foreign sales in
1999. Of the 20 companies in the list, which had
US$ 66.2 billion in exports between them,13 nine were
local private-sector firms, seven were foreign and four
were State-owned; foreign companies held five of the
top 10 places, along with four State-owned companies
and just one local private-sector one (Cemex). Only
one local private-sector company is active in an area
that is not directly linked with the extraction or
processing of natural resources: Empresa Brasileira de
Aeronáutica (Embraer), an aircraft manufacturer, which
ranks eleventh in the list.
The fact that State enterprises still account for a
quarter of all exports by the 200 largest exporters
(table 7) shows that privatization has come up against
limits in the region, something that is often forgotten.
In particular, the region’s two largest exporters are
Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and Petróleos
Mexicanos (Pemex), while the 10 largest also include
the Corporación Nacional del Cobre (Codelco) of Chile
and the Empresa Colombiana de Petróleos (Ecopetrol).
Combining the information from tables 7 and 8
makes it possible to study the strategies and
performance of large companies, particularly
transnational and local private-sector ones. Analysis of
the impact of State enterprises is beyond the scope of
this work, but could appropriately be carried out in
studies on the oil sector and, to a lesser extent, copper
mining.14
TABLE 8
Latin America: Twenty largest exporters, 1999
(Millions of dollars)
Company Ownership Activity Exports
1. Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) State Extraction of crude oil and natural gas. Refining
and petrochemicals. 16 299
2. Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) State Extraction of crude oil and natural gas. Refining
and petrochemicals. 9 914
3. General Motors Mexico Foreign Production of motor vehicles. 5 050
4. Volkswagen Mexico Foreign Production of motor vehicles. 5 040
5. Chrysler Mexico Foreign Production of motor vehicles. 3 792
6. IBM Mexico Foreign Production of information technology, office
and accounting machinery. 3 000
7. Cementos Mexicanos (CEMEX) Local private-sector Cement production. 2 665
8. Corporación Nacional del Cobre Chile (CODELCO) State Extraction of metal ores (copper). 2 501
9. Ford Mexico Foreign Production of motor vehicles. 2 330
10. Empresa Colombiana de Petróleos (ECOPETROL) State Extraction of crude oil and natural gas.
Refining and petrochemicals. 2 170
11. Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica (EMBRAER) Local private-sector Aircraft production. 1 692
12. Nissan Mexico Foreign Production of motor vehicles. 1 586
13. Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) (Brazil) Local private-sector Mining, cellulose, aluminium, transport. 1 542
14. Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF) (Argentina) Foreign Extraction of crude oil and natural gas. Refining. 1 436
15. Fed. Nac. de Cafeteros (FEDECAFE) (Colombia) Local private-sector Coffee marketing. 1 418
16. Odebrecht (Brazil) Local private-sector Construction and engineering. Chemicals and
petrochemicals. Cellulose. 1 317
17. CINTRA (Aeroméxico and Mexicana de Aviación) Local private-sector Air transportation of passengers and goods and
allied services. 1 185
18. Philips (Mexico) Foreign Production of radio, television and communications
equipment and apparatus. 1 095
19. Cargill Argentina Foreign Inputs for the agricultural sector. Ingredients for the food
industry. 1 084
20. GRUMA-Grupo Maseca (Mexico) Local private-sector Manufacture of food products
(maize flour and tortillas). 1 047
Source: Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, ECLAC.
13
 This figure represents approximately half of all exports by the
200 largest exporters and a quarter of the region’s total exports.
14
 Small and medium-sized enterprises, although they have made
progress with exporting, still account for only a very small
percentage, as almost all their output goes to domestic markets
(Peres and Stumpo, 2000).
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In manufacturing, the direction of international
markets and the renewed patterns of competition
resulting from trade and financial liberalization aroused
the interest of new entrants and forced transnational
companies already operating in the region to reconsider
their strategies. Macroeconomic stabilization and
structural reform programmes meant a radical shift in
the macroeconomic variables of the region’s economies
(exchange rates, interest rates) and in the institutions
and regulatory frameworks applying to economic agents
(Katz, 2000 and Stallings and Peres, 2000).
Some transnational companies withdrew (opting
in some cases to supply local markets through exports),
or rationalized their operations to defend or increase
their market share (generally by means of defensive
strategies designed to cope with competition from
exports), or restructured their activities, which involved
making new investments that took particular account
of changes in the national, subregional (NAFTA and
Mercosur) and international environments (Mortimore,
2000). In manufacturing industry it is possible to
identify two sets of basic strategies, the objectives of
which, respectively, are to increase the efficiency of
the IIPS created by transnational companies and to obtain
access to national and subregional markets for
manufactured goods (table 9).
The first strategy has mainly involved investing in
the motor vehicle and vehicle parts, information
technology, electronics and wearing apparel industries
in Mexico and the Caribbean.15 The second has involved
large investments in the automotive and food subsectors
and in the chemical and machinery industries to supply
local markets. In Mercosur, particularly, investments
have been made by companies with a large presence to
defend their market share, particularly for compact
cars.16 New entrants have also arrived in search of
market niches.17
TABLE 9
Latin America: The strategies of transnational companies
in the region in the 1990s
Strategy Efficiency- Raw materials- Market access-seeking
Sector seeking seeking (national or regional)
Oil/gas: Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil,
Primary Colombia and Venezuela
Minerals: Argentina,
Chile and Peru
Vehicles: Mexico Vehicles: Mercosur
Electronics: Mexico and Agroindustry: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico
Manufactures Caribbean Basin Chemicals: Brazil
Garments: Mexico and Cement: Colombia, Dominican Rep.
Caribbean Basin and Venezuela
Finance: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela
Telecommunications: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and
Peru
Retail: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico
Services Electricity: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia
and Central America
Gas distribution: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and
Colombia
Tourism: Mexico and Caribbean Basin
Source: ECLAC, Division of Production, Productivity and Management, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies.
15
 The most representative examples in the automotive industry are
the operations of General Motors, Ford, Daimler-Chrysler,
Volkswagen, Nissan and Lear Corp., in Mexico. In the area of
information technology, the largest investments are those of IBM and
Hewlett Packard in Mexico and Intel in Costa Rica. The operations
of Sony, Philips, Samsung, Matsushita and General Electric in Mexico
illustrate what is happening in the electronics industry. As regards
wearing apparel, the best examples are provided by Sara Lee and
Fruit of the Loom in Mexico and the Caribbean Basin.
16
 For example, Ford, General Motors, Volkswagen and Fiat.
17
 This is the case with Chrysler, Renault, BMW, Toyota and Honda.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 4  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 148
CORPORATE COMPETIT IVENESS IN  LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN  •  MICHAEL MORTIMORE AND WILSON PERES
Meanwhile, deregulation and privatization in the
Latin American economies have opened up new
investment opportunities in sectors to which access was
previously restricted for the private sector in general,
and foreign companies in particular. This has led to a
massive influx of companies that did not previously
have a large presence in Latin America, especially in
the areas of services, infrastructure and extraction. Two
further strategies can thus be identified: foreign
investors in the region are seeking access to national
markets in service and infrastructure sectors, and access
to sources of raw materials.
In service businesses, the size of the local market,
regulatory systems and technological change have been
determining factors in the decisions made by foreign
investors. Their impact is measured by their contribution
to the systemic competitiveness of the economy, the
access to new products and services they give the
population, and the spread of international best practice.
This is of the greatest importance to Latin America and
the Caribbean, as in recent years investment in the
service sector has grown considerably, the prime
examples being telecommunications, financial services
and electricity, particularly in Mercosur and Chile.18
The entry of transnational companies into
extractive activities has been characterized by renewal
of the production organization model, the application
of new technologies and the reform of regulatory
systems in countries that have abundant natural
resources.19 In general, the impact of these investments,
which tend to benefit from very favourable tax waivers,
has been measured by the extent to which exports of
natural resources have increased and to which the
necessary infrastructure has been constructed.20
Of the strategies adopted by transnational
enterprises, two have a direct influence on a country’s
trade performance: the search for raw materials, and
efficiency-seeking. The search for raw materials has
been a very important strategy, and still is for the
countries that are invested in, even though primary
products are not a very dynamic component of
international trade. Foreign direct investment plays an
important role in decisions on major projects relating
to natural resources for export; but these projects come
up against natural constraints, and their impact on the
economic growth of a developing country has clear
limitations. The development theory that deals with
these issues states that, ultimately, the production of
raw materials yields decreasing returns and displays
low income elasticity in international trade.21
Efficiency-seeking is a strategy of growing
importance to developing countries. In pursuit of
efficiency, some industries have been relocated on a
large scale, examples being the wearing apparel,
automotive and electronics industries, with a view to
taking advantage of lower assembly or production costs
in particular places (UNCTAD, 2000). Manufacturing
companies are investing outside their countries of origin
to build IIPS and thereby adapt to the globalization
process. Consequently, large transnational companies
are setting up specialized modern plants in certain
countries where they can produce more cheaply without
losing access to their main markets. It is here that
domestic policies in developing countries can have an
effect by influencing the siting of FDI and thus the
generation of the technology flows that come with such
investment.
b) Specialization by locally owned groups
Large locally owned private-sector groups and
companies22 have a strong position in Latin American
markets, owing to processes that have occurred as part
of the structural changes seen since the early 1980s in
national economies and internationally. These large
local groups and companies, along with the subsidiaries
of transnational enterprises, are the largest and most
dynamic business units operating in the region’s
18
 In telecommunications, the investments of Telefónica of Spain,
Italia Telecom and BellSouth. In financial services, Banco
Santander Central Hispano (BSCH), Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria (BBVA) and Citibank. In commerce, Carrefour, Wal-Mart,
Royal Ahold and Groupe Casino Guichard. In electrical power, the
leading operations are those of Endesa España, AES Corporation
and Duke Energy.
19
 See ECLAC (forthcoming), chapter II.
20
 The leading companies involved include Repsol, Royal Dutch
Shell, Exxon and Broken Hill Proprietary.
21
 Economic expansion derives from two sources: the increase in
factors of production and the increase in production per factor unit.
Where returns are decreasing, there is a limit to what growth can
be achieved through greater utilization of factors of production,
which means that efficiency needs to be improved if sustainable
per capita income growth is to be generated (Krugman, 1994).
22
 Although the distinction should be drawn whenever reference is
made to large companies and the businesses concerned are actually
groups or conglomerates, the total number of large, independent
locally owned companies in the region is very small. Most large
companies form part of formal or informal groups, as different laws
or investor practices dictate. This section has been based largely
on Garrido and Peres (1998), and on the analyses of national cases
included in Peres (coord., 1998).
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industry. This shared dominance has tended to
consolidate since most State companies were privatized.
The competitive position of these firms is
jeopardized by their own structural characteristics, in
particular their small size as compared with their
international competitors and their position in
technologically mature sectors that are growing
relatively slowly in the world market.23 They have not
grown strongly enough to draw the rest of their national
economies along with them, which means it is difficult
to regard their position in the competition as one of
real leadership.
The great majority of the large locally owned
private-sector groups and companies that now hold a
prominent place in Latin American business were
created during the import substitution industrialization
process,24 although some companies date back to the
early twentieth century, when industrialization began
in the region’s more advanced countries.25 Alongside
those companies founded before and during the import
substitution process are some new ones, a number of
them very powerful, which were founded or developed
during the structural reforms carried out from the 1980s
onward. These new organizations have emerged both
from the privatization of traditional businesses (Enersis
in Chile, subsequently sold to Endesa España) and from
dynamic conglomeration processes based on a portfolio
logic (the Carso group in Mexico).
One characteristic of these companies that is
essential to any evaluation of their impact on the
competitiveness of the region’s countries is the sector
of activity they operate in, and the influence they exert
there. Garrido and Peres (1998), who studied the five
largest companies in 19 industrial sectors in 1996,
highlight the concentration of Latin American industry.
The 83 companies (local and foreign) that featured
among the five largest in each sector had sales of
US$ 122 billion and accounted for almost 780,000 jobs
in 1996, a year in which the gross industrial output of
the region was some US$ 750 billion, with industrial
employment standing at about 8.5 million people.26
Local companies had a share of 39.8% in the total sales
of this group.
The sectors in which the sales of the five largest
local firms predominated (over 66% of the total) were
traditional activities involving the production of mass
consumption goods or basic inputs (non-alcoholic
drinks and beer, glass, petrochemicals, steel, textiles,
agro-industrial products, cement, and cellulose and
paper), and one metallurgical industry, the production
of car parts. While domestic companies had an
intermediate share (between 30% and 66% of the total)
in foods, machinery and equipment27 and white goods
and electronics, this share was very low or nil in certain
highly technology- and marketing-intensive sectors,
such as motor vehicles, computer and telephony
equipment, tyres, chemicals, hygiene and cleaning
items and tobacco products.
Although privatization has enabled locally owned
private-sector companies to enter modern areas outside
the industrial sector (one example being
telecommunications, where they have had to go into
partnership with large transnational firms to cope with
the intense competition that exists),28 they have not
secured a major share in technologically advanced
manufacturing activities at the international level.29 This
appreciation is confirmed by information on the 20
largest locally owned private-sector companies
(industrial and non-industrial) in 1999 (table 10).
23
 Among the 100 largest industrial enterprises, Garrido and Peres
(1998) show that, while large local companies increased their sales
from an average of US$ 827 million apiece in 1990 to US$ 1.345
billion in 1996, they are still smaller than the subsidiaries of foreign
firms (US$ 1.879 billion). Furthermore, the sales of these large
local companies often do not amount to so much as 10% of those
of the international enterprises they compete with.
24
 The proportion of the largest companies of today that were created
or saw their peak development during the import substitution phase
is strikingly large. By the end of the 1970s they already held a
position as important as they do today, examples being Votorantim
in Brazil, Acindar in Argentina and the Compañía de Acero del
Pacífico in Chile, although they have all had to carry out profound
restructuring to maintain their position.
25
 Bunge y Born in Argentina, Alpargatas in Argentina and Brazil,
the core of Grupo Monterrey in Mexico, Bavaria in Colombia and
the Compañía de Cervecerías Unidas in Chile, among others.
26
 This employment figure does not include microenterprises.
27
 Essentially because of the output of Condumex, a Mexican firm
producing electrical conductors.
28
 In some cases, these groups have since sold on the privatized
firms to foreign partners or investors.
29
 The cases where groups have entered advanced-technology
industries have been very few, the most noteworthy being the
investments made by Grupo Pulsar (Mexico) in biotechnology and
some stakes, often short-lived, held by Brazilian groups in joint
ventures for the development of software, computer equipment or
consumer electronics, mainly while the reserved market policy was
in force (Itautec Philco, Semp Toshiba, Sharp, NEC, CCE da
Amazónia, for example). Of the 46 large companies studied in detail
in Garrido and Peres (1998), just one (Sonda, Chile) could be
regarded as specializing in one of the technologies characteristic
of the current technological revolution (software production).
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Table 10 highlights three circumstances: firstly, the
strong presence of Mexican firms, which have 13 places
in the list, followed by five Brazilian firms, one Chilean
one and just one Argentine one (the showing of Brazil,
and even more so that of Argentina, is weak by
comparison with the size of their economies); secondly,
the continued predominance of the activities pointed
to by Garrido and Peres (1998), to which may now be
added telecommunications companies in Brazil and
Mexico, large-scale retail trade, air transportation and
activities linked to mining and the petroleum sector;
and, lastly, the main exporters in the group are to be
found in mining (CVRD), cement (Cemex), petroleum
and petrochemicals (Alfa, Copec) and foods (Bimbo).
In short, the latest information shows no change in the
situation: companies specializing in mature-technology
sectors, closely linked with the processing of natural
resources.
Sectoral specialization in relatively homogeneous
goods offering large economies of scale but produced
by companies that are small compared to their main
competitors lends a certain vulnerability to the
competitive position of local private-sector companies.
Protectionism meant that some of these sectors
specialized in virtually untradable products, so that their
performance depended entirely on the domestic market.
As economies opened up, these sectors were
increasingly confronted with competitors of global
stature, whose power grew as their numbers shrank. As
a result, local private-sector companies have lost the
stability they enjoyed as leaders in these traditional
sectors, and are now faced with the challenge of either
growing or being absorbed by large international firms.
To complete this profile of local private-sector
companies, it is necessary to describe the relationships
they have established between their domestic markets
and the international one. Their reaction to external
competition, apart from the different strategies they
followed to defend segments of their domestic markets,
has been to branch out into non-traditional exports with
the aim of extending their markets beyond the country,
either within their historical regional ambits or in those
they have developed as a result of integration, and even
into the great markets of the industrialized countries.
Of the 41 domestic firms that belonged in 1996 to
the top five in 19 industrial sectors, as examined in Peres
(coord., 1998), 37 were exporters, although the sample
does not record the value of their exports in all cases.
TABLE 10
Latin America: Twenty largest local private-sector companies, by 1999 sales
(Millions of dollars and number of employees)
Company Country Activity Sales Employees Exports
1. Carso Global Telecom (TELMEX)a Mexico Telecommunications 10 242 73 321 930
2. Cementos Mexicanos (CEMEX) Mexico Cement 4 826 20 902 2 665
3. Grupo Carso Mexico Diversified (electrical components, services) 4 272 42 810 600
4. Grupo Alfa Mexico Diversified (petrochemicals, steel) 4 240 35 615 957
5. Fomento Económico Mexicano (FEMSA) Mexico Beer and non-alcoholic drinks 4 060 41 367 554
6. Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) Brazil Extraction of metal ores 3 901 10 740 1 542
7. Tele Norte-Leste Participações (TELEMAR) Brazil Telecommunications 3 478 ... ...
8. Techint organization Argentina Iron and steel, construction 3 407 28 461 647
9. Compañía de Petróleos de Chile (COPEC) Chile Extraction of crude oil and natural gas
and allied services 3 169 8 076 854
10. Companhia Brasileira de Petróleo Ipiranga Brazil Extraction of crude oil and natural gas
and allied services 3 106 1 643 ...
11. Bimbo Industrial Group Mexico Manufacture of food products 3 026 63 371 965
12. Controladora Comercial Mexicana Mexico Wholesale trade 2 855 30 093 ...
13. Grupo Votorantim Brazil Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 2 815 ... ...
14. Vitro Mexico Glass manufacturing 2 720 32 535 749
15. Savia Mexico Manufacture of food products and drinks 2 664 18 683 794
16. Viação Aérea Rio-Grandense (VARIG) Brazil Air transportation 2 486 15 600 170
17. Grupo Desc Mexico Diversified (petrochemicals, vehicle parts) 2 444 20 878 993
18. Grupo Gigante Mexico Wholesale trade 2 414 33 445 15
19. Soriana organization Mexico Wholesale trade 2 169 29 985 ...
20. Grupo Televisa Mexico Entertainment, television 1 889 ... ...
Source: Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, ECLAC.
a
 Telcel exports.
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Of the sectors where local companies predominated,
exports to sales ratios were particularly high in
agribusiness, cellulose and paper, steel and glass.
Considering only the 24 local firms for which export
data were given, the average ratio for the 19 industrial
sectors was 23.6%. This percentage, although almost
double the equivalent 1994 figure (13.1%), was much
lower than that recorded for the foreign companies in
the sample (33.9%). This result was heavily influenced
by the exports of automotive firms.
One group of local private-sector companies,
generally the largest, internationalized their businesses
more fully, exporting not only goods but capital as well.
They have carried out direct investment abroad, whether
by setting up new companies, taking over existing ones,
or concluding strategic alliances or mergers.
This internationalization followed two models. On
the one hand, some companies sought a regional
presence as trade integration consolidated, as in the case
of private-sector firms operating in Mercosur or within
the framework of NAFTA. The largest investments in
Mercosur were made by Enersis and the Compañía
Manufacturera de Papeles y Cartones (CMPC) of Chile,
Brazilian car part producers, and COFAP, in Argentina.
In NAFTA, the largest investments were those made by
Vitro (Mexico) in the United States. Some of the most
noteworthy of these efforts, which seemed to promise
a growing movement towards internationalization
among local private-sector companies, were not
followed through, either because the companies
concerned were taken over by foreign investors, as
Enersis was by Endesa España, or because they
withdrew from some markets where they were unable
to compete efficiently, one example being Vitro and its
United States subsidiary Anchor Glass, which the
Mexican company had to sell seven years after
acquiring it in 1989. These groups did not achieve the
scale and capabilities they needed to sustain their
progress.
The other type of internationalization is more
complex, and involves companies setting up a coherent
system of subsidiaries in a number of countries in
pursuit of a common strategy. These companies seek
to become international, an aspiration that is heavily
influenced by the form competition takes in their
industries, examples being the manufacture of cement,
steel tubes, bottled refreshments and beer. The most
important cases in the region are those of Cementos
Mexicanos (Cemex), which has investments in the
United States, Spain, South and Central America and
East Asia, and Techint, an Argentine firm which is a
leader in the production of seamless tubes, and which
has investments in Latin America and Europe.
The strategies of local private-sector companies can
be classified as retreat, defence and offence,30 although
the first of these will lead in the long run to the company
going out of business, or to the original owners losing
control. All three strategies are found among local
private-sector firms although, because of their size,
retreat tends to take the form of transfers of full
ownership or majority control to external investors
rather than outright closure, as happened with the Astra
oil group in Argentina, the car part producer COFAP in
Brazil and the two large Mexican cigarette
manufacturers (Cigarros La Tabacalera Mexicana,
CIGATAM and La Moderna).
Different methods have been used to defend
domestic markets, the principal ones being pre-emptive
investment (especially in the two largest economies),
importing finished products to market them through
local distribution networks, increasing and enhancing
the focus on customer service (especially in the food
industries), creating industrial and financial groups (in
countries where the law allows this),31 and rent-seeking
in the form of efforts to secure fiscal, commercial or
sectoral promotion benefits which, although they count
for less now than in the past, have not entirely
disappeared, as is illustrated by the cases of the
automotive industry in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico,
the forestry industry in Chile and the support given to
a variety of industrial sectors in Colombia.
Although it involves new diversified investments,
one type of defensive strategy that has found favour is
a move from industrial activities to modern non-tradable
30
 Defence, of course, is not a strategy that makes much sense in
the long term. In the face of increased competitive pressure and
the technological revolution now in progress, a defensive strategy
can only be a stage on the way to retreat or offence. Experience
also shows that there is no need for an initial defensive stage, as
many of the largest companies adopted an offensive strategy right
from the outset of the external debt crisis. Asset restructuring
(mergers and acquisitions), investments abroad and linkage with
the financial sector took place throughout the 1980s, although they
were combined with strategies to defend domestic market share
when the opening up process came into effect.
31
 Of the region’s large and medium-sized countries, Chile stands
out as the one with the lowest degree of formal linkage between
industry and the banking system, this being a result of the crisis
experienced in the early 1980s, although some of the country’s
industrial groups have clear links with banks. Again, in Chile, as
in Brazil, pension funds (private-sector ones in the first case, those
of the great State enterprises in the second) are holding a greater
and greater proportion of the largest companies’ share capital. This
could open up new paths towards financially based conglomeration.
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services, such as telecommunications, or television and
entertainment (table 10). The tendency to leave the
industrial sectors is driven by the signals arising from
trade liberalization and the macroeconomic policy of
maintaining exchange rates that overvalue national
currencies, which puts pressure on the profitability of
tradable sectors. Meanwhile, opportunities to invest in
non-tradable services, and the potential for benefiting
from such investments, have been opened up by the
deregulation of certain markets or the privileged access
that some groups have been given to privatizations in
the areas of telecommunications, electricity distribution
and infrastructure in general.
It would seem that structural reform has not
altogether done away with the rent-seeking behaviour
of major business sectors since, while some non-
tradable services markets are fiercely contested among
strong competitors, the conditions of this competition,
and thus the profitability that is ultimately achieved,
depend on State regulations and the different levels of
access granted to the competitors.
Offensive strategies are more complex. Firstly,
there is the strategy of growth through ever-increasing
specialization around the essential core of the business,
which is happening in some companies whose primary
activity is the processing of natural resources, such as
Klabin in Brazil, Alfa in Mexico and Pérez Companc
and Bunge y Born in Argentina. This last is an extreme
case, in that it is withdrawing from industrial activities
to its original agricultural and trading base. Also
belonging to this group are companies that have not
increased what has traditionally been a high level of
specialization, such as Cemex in Mexico and Grupo
Matte in Chile.
A second strategy is growth through a moderate
increase in diversification, which may combine vertical
disintegration at the individual company level with
greater vertical or horizontal integration at the group
level as the result of participation in a few privatizations
or in mergers or acquisitions involving other private-
sector companies. In all cases, achieving potential
synergies is the key objective when operations of this
type are undertaken. Techint and Pescarmona in
Argentina, Angelini in Chile, Suzano and Votorantim
in Brazil, Santo Domingo (Bavaria) in Colombia and
Pulsar in Mexico are examples of this moderate strategy.
Lastly, there is the strategy of growth through
extreme diversification, largely by means of
participation in numerous privatizations. These cases,
which give rise to true conglomerates without obvious
productive, commercial or even financial synergies, are
often the result of a portfolio investment approach. The
most striking cases are Sociedad Comercial del Plata
(energy, construction and services) in Argentina,
Vicunha (textiles, iron and steel and mining) in Brazil,
and Carso (telephony, electrical conductors, tyres and
restaurants) in Mexico. These conglomerates engage
in very diverse activities, and the vigorous development
they have achieved relatively recently has been based
on strong links to the international capital market, the
largest domestic banks and the political authority
responsible for privatization decisions. Naturally, the
financial risks and the benefits hoped for are high.
In each case, the strategies adopted depend on a
complex set of factors. The sectoral factor is generally
important, as competitiveness, and thus the ability to
compete with imports in a liberalized economy, differs
from sector to sector. The same is true of a sector’s
maturity, which is the result of a specific learning path
along which greater or lesser progress may have been
made, and of the range of promotional policies applying
to it, as these, although they often go unrecognized,
have been important in almost all the countries
(petrochemicals in Argentina, the forestry industry in
Chile and the automotive industry in Brazil and Mexico
are some noteworthy examples). Nonetheless, the
sectoral determinant is not enough in itself to account
for corporate strategies.
The caution (or boldness) of corporate leaderships,
as difficult as this is to define, is an important factor in
explaining what strategy is ultimately adopted.
Differences in management style –which are largely
independent of systemic factors– would also seem to
account for the varying levels of interest shown by
different groups in relation to privatizations, ranging
from extremely modest participation, or none at all, to
an overwhelming presence both in the country of origin
and elsewhere. Of course, management style and the
quest for economic power are often inseparable in
operational terms.
The above information, and the national case
studies carried out for the region’s three largest
countries (Ferraz and Iootty, 2000, for Brazil; Garrido,
2000, for Mexico and Kulfas, 2000, for Argentina),
reveal not only that local companies have lost ground
to transnational ones, but that their pattern of
specialization in production and international trade has
retained its basic characteristic, with activities
associated with the production or processing of natural
resources predominating, but combined with a degree
of participation in certain modern non-tradable sectors,
such as telecommunications and the communications
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media. If any shift is occurring, it would seem to be in
the direction of yet greater predominance for primary
activities, something that is most evident in the case of
Argentina. It is for this reason that Kulfas (2000) has
indicated that locally owned groups are going through
a process of “primarization”, the most striking example
of which is the withdrawal of Bunge y Born from
industrial activities. There are exceptions to the general
trend, in the form of efforts by local companies to
introduce more technology-intensive activities that are
better placed to compete internationally. The most
noteworthy examples are the production of aircraft by
Embraer and the seed biotechnology activities of Savia
(Grupo Pulsar, Mexico). These cases are a minority,
however, and have not yet demonstrated the ability to
survive in the face of international competition.32 The
activities that are most advanced and consolidated at
the world level continue to be tied to natural resources;
the most striking examples are the production of cement
by Cemex (Mexico) and the construction of seamless
tubes by Techint (Argentina).
Considering how local private-sector companies
developed during the 1990s and how the dynamic of
international trade and the sectoral and technological
pattern of the region’s participation in the
international economy have been shifting, it has to
be said that local private-sector companies, powerful
agents in the region’s economy though they still are,




The results of this research show that the region’s
international competitiveness has improved, but that
progress has largely been confined to a few countries,
sectors and firms. Increased heterogeneity in the ways
the region participates in the international market,
something that has been pointed out, for example, by
Stallings and Peres (2000) and Katz (2000), has been
one important result of the economic reforms that
strengthened the role of market mechanisms in the
allocation of resources, prompting greater
specialization in the production structure and increased
linkage of this with the outside world.
The different conditions under which the countries
have engaged, through trade agreements, with different
segments of the world economy have given rise, in
conjunction with differences in cost advantages, to two
styles of international trade participation. In Mexico
and the Caribbean Basin, exports of manufactures
assembled for the United States market predominate,
the main concentrations being in the automotive,
electronics and garment industries and most exporting
being carried out by subsidiaries of efficiency-seeking
transnational companies, generally within the
framework of their IIPS. In South America, by contrast,
natural resource production and processing activities
prevail, although some more advanced manufactures,
such as automobiles, are produced and traded within
the region, especially within Mercosur.
Both sectoral specializations bring with them
opportunities and difficulties. Specialization in
assembly in maquila plants or free trade zones has
enabled countries, including some very small and
undeveloped ones, to increase their exports
significantly, as a result of which they have been able
to penetrate dynamic sectors of strong demand in the
United States economy (which grew very vigorously
during the 1990s). This specialization, however, has
largely been confined to the lower value added sections
of IIPS. Although there are signs of technological
upgrading in Mexican maquila plants (so that reference
is sometimes made to “third-generation maquila”), in
the Caribbean and even in Mexico it is straightforward
assembly activities that predominate.33 Even in cases
32
 The activities of Pulsar in biotechnology and seed production
began in 1997 and have gradually been tied in with the global
technological research and development strategy of Monsanto
(Garrido, 2000). The success of Embraer has been the result of
many years of public policy support, which is coming up against
increasing opposition in the context of current international trade
regulations (Miranda, 2000).
33
 First-generation maquila industries require few or no workforce
skills and give preference to volume over quality. Second-
generation ones have certain requirements as regards quality and
precision, use modern machinery, and generally need workers to
have a secondary education. They employ modern forms of labour
organization. Third-generation maquila industries mainly employ
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where more progress has been made, extension of the
full package system to the Mexican apparel sector being
an example, the activities that add most value (design
and marketing) remain in the hands of head offices
located in the United States.
The specialization of South America in sectors
associated with natural resources is neither good nor
bad in itself, and it has allowed countries such as Chile
to increase their share of the world market. Analysis
shows, however, that these sectors are not very
dynamic in international trade (the dynamic defined
by their low income elasticity of demand) and generally
use mature technologies. The relatively small size of
the leading local firms by comparison with their global
competitors has meant that a number of them have
withdrawn from the market, with their assets
consequently being sold off to foreign investors. The
strategy of these investors has generally been to explore
new markets or sources of raw materials, by contrast
with the efficiency-seeking strategy that prevails north
of the Panama Canal.
The fact that progress with international
competitiveness has largely been confined to certain
economic agents, particularly large firms, be they
transnational or locally owned, has been beneficial in
terms of efficiency, to judge by the rising volume of
exports and the share of these in the total. As these
leaders have not drawn other agents in the local
economy along in their wake, however, their strength
has heightened the polarization of the production
structure. Massive substitution of imports for locally
produced inputs has made it possible to increase
efficiency and to export, but has resulted in a breakdown
of production chains. As a result the rest of the economy
has lagged, so that Latin America has had export growth
but not export-led growth (Stallings and Peres, 2000).
In short, the opportunities opened up by globalization
have not been capitalized upon.
The most negative part of the regional picture is
the way progress with international competitiveness has
been confined to just a few countries. This would seem
to suggest that other factors, such as trade agreements
and methods for attracting foreign investment, have
played a more important role. In this respect, as in a
number of others, the reforms have been unable to
achieve the objectives that were set for them.
V
Policy recommendations
There is a need to consider what policy measures can
best serve to overcome the shortcomings resulting from
the fact that improvements in competitiveness have
largely been confined to just a few countries, sectors
and firms. There are four aspects of policy that seem to
be of particular importance:
i) Given the decisive role played by transnational
companies in the region’s exports and competitiveness,
there is a need for more effective policies to attract FDI,
particularly new investments, rather than investment
that goes into purchasing existing assets. Mortimore
and Peres (1998) show that the countries use three types
of mechanisms to compete for FDI: offering incentives
(essentially fiscal in nature), introducing norms that
enhance competitiveness (the rule of law, market access
through trade negotiations, labour and environmental
standards) or creating assets (infrastructure and human
resources). The first mechanism, although it may be
effective in the short term, risks descending rapidly into
a negative-sum game. The second type of instrument
may have positive or negative effects, depending on
the competition, when the regulations introduced
improve on or weaken previous standards, something
that is particularly harmful when there is a race to the
bottom in labour or environmental standards. The
creation of assets, lastly, while it is the most difficult
mechanism to implement, is the most efficient one for
national economies in the long term.
ii) Considering that the integration of transnational
companies into IIPS has been the most effective
mechanism for raising international competitiveness,
attention should be turned to ways of increasing this
integration in the countries where it already exists or
university-educated human resources for more knowledge-intensive
activities. Buitelaar and Padilla (2000) identify a sprinkling of third-
generation maquila companies, in Mexico; most of that country’s
plants are second-generation. In Central America and the Caribbean,
first- and second-generation plants coexist, with the latter gaining
in importance.
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achieving it in the great majority that are particularly
isolated from the most dynamic chains of world trade.
The key role in this respect is played by trade
negotiations to open up new markets that make it
profitable to expand IIPS to new sectors and countries.
Consideration should also be given to how progress
can be made in incorporating segments of IIPS that add
more value and how these can be tied in to the rest of
the national economy. Although there have been cases
of spontaneous progress in this direction, such as the
move towards third-generation maquila, examples from
international and regional experience show how
efficient it is to develop policies to attract specific
foreign companies or to increase the supply of inputs
by local producers. By way of example, it is enough to
allude to the measures taken by Costa Rica to attract
investment from Intel in microprocessor production and
the efficient programmes implemented in Singapore to
develop local suppliers. Competition to attract
investment by creating assets has contributed to this
success, and efforts of this kind are particularly
important for small countries that cannot expect the
lure of their internal markets to produce good results.
iii) Closely related to the above is the question of
linkage with worldwide knowledge networks.
Specialization by locally owned groups in natural
resource-related activities requires local technological
research and development efforts that, because of the
very nature of these resources, cannot be undertaken
away from their physical context (Katz, 2000). These
efforts –as has been shown by the biotechnology
research of Grupo Pulsar, which has tended to become
tied in with the research and development structure of
Monsanto– are difficult to undertake efficiently in
isolation from world technology developments. The
instruments needed to achieve this technological
impetus are well known from both regional and
international experience; particular mention should be
made of economies such as Japan, the Republic of
Korea and Taiwan, whose domestic companies have
made long-term efforts to improve their technological
level, and have as a result succeeded, over time, in
becoming transnationals.
iv) Given the relatively small size of domestic
business groups by comparison with their global
competitors, there is a need to support and strengthen
their ability to create joint ventures and strategic
alliances with those competitors, preferably under
circumstances where they do not lose control of their
assets. To this end, there is a need to develop corporate
governance systems that make it attractive for foreign
investors to participate in such alliances as minority
partners. Experience shows that corporate governance
systems can coexist very well with efforts to strengthen
policies that defend competition and even, where
necessary, with regulatory frameworks that promote it.
In summary, what this work proposes is the
development and implementation of national strategies
and active policies to supplement reform. Although
some results are to be looked for from the spontaneous
working of the market, international experience with
efforts to attract and capitalize on foreign investment
suggests that passive policies tend to result in greater
benefits being generated for the investing companies
than for the countries they invest in (Mortimore, 2000).
These policies are not easy to apply, given the
weakness of the State in terms of human and financial
resources. Although some instruments only involve
changes to regulatory systems and cost little, making a
country more attractive by creating assets and nurturing
suppliers requires substantial resources. If applied
successfully, this policy would allow more countries in
the region to participate in the world market, and would
even marginally improve the sectoral and technological
quality of this participation.
Changing the pattern of specialization more
radically by creating dynamic comparative advantages
is a challenge that should be addressed by economic
development studies. The conclusions of this work raise
questions about this point. The relatively balanced triad
–the State, large local firms and transnationals– on
which industrialization and growth in Latin America
were formerly based has been virtually destroyed by
privatization and the relative decline of domestic firms
(Reinhardt and Peres, 2000). The new pattern of
economic leadership is still being defined, although
everything points to it centring on transnational
corporations. Experiences such as those of Singapore
and Ireland show that this is viable and can be an
efficient way of generating rapid growth. The main
doubts still remaining, which it is beyond the scope of
this work to address, have to do with the political
repercussions of this model, the economic conditions
that would make it viable in the region’s less developed
countries, and its appropriateness for the larger
countries.
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